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IS DICK CHENEY UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 
Glenn Harlan Reynolds* 
The Vice Presidency “isn’t worth a bucket of warm spit.” 
Vice President John Nance Garner1 
Twenty years ago I wouldn’t have advised my worst enemy to take the Vice-
Presidency.  It was God’s way of punishing bad campaigners, a sort of po-
litical purgatory for the also-rans.  Now you’d be crazy not to take the job.  
Aide to President Ronald Reagan2 
Many a true word is spoken in jest, we’re told. More surprisingly, 
sometimes the truth even emerges, unsought, from the mouths of politicians 
and their flacks.  This may be the case with regard to recent claims by Vice 
President Dick Cheney’s office that he is, properly speaking, a “legislative 
officer” rather than a member of the executive branch.3  The consequences 
of this argument, however, may prove unpalatable to the Bush Administra-
tion on closer examination.  Indeed, an activist Vice Presidency, in the 
Cheney model, might be considered unconstitutional if the Vice President is 
regarded as a legislative official.  And, regardless of whether that charac-
terization controls, there may be prudential reasons for keeping the Vice 
President at a greater remove from executive affairs than has recently been 
the case. 
The Cheney-as-legislator kerfuffle appeared as part of an interbranch 
struggle over the declassification of documents.  Rep. Henry Waxman ar-
gued that Cheney was avoiding legally required scrutiny by the National 
Archives and Records Administration, while Cheney’s office argued that 
 
*  Beauchamp Brogan Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee; J.D. Yale Law 
School, 1985, B.A. University of Tennessee, 1982.  My thanks to Ben Barton, Brannon Denning, and 
Otis Stephens for their helpful comments on this piece. 
1  Quoted in Daniel May, The Third Vice President of the United States of Earth, 73 A.B.A. J. 76, 76 
(1987). 
2  Quoted in PAUL C. LIGHT, VICE-PRESIDENTIAL POWER:  ADVICE AND INFLUENCE IN THE WHITE 
HOUSE 1 (1984). 
3  Peter Baker, White House Defends Cheney’s Refusal of Oversight, WASHINGTON POST, June 23, 
2007, at A02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/22/ 
AR2007062201809.html (link) (noting that Vice President Cheney claims he is not part of the executive 
branch, but “president of the Senate”). 
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Cheney, as President of the Senate, was not part of the executive branch and 
hence not subject to such regulation.4   
The political backlash engendered by this position5 led Cheney’s office 
to withdraw to the more defensible position that the Office of the Vice Pres-
ident, like the Office of the President, was not an “agency” for purposes of 
the statute.  Nevertheless, Cheney’s spokesmen did not repudiate the earlier 
position.6  And, in fact, I believe that the positioning of the Vice Presidency 
within the legislative branch—or, at any rate, outside the executive—may 
be appropriate.  Such a reading, however, would render Cheney’s role7 
within the Bush Administration, as well as the modern notion of Vice Pres-
idents as junior versions of the commander-in-chief, unconstitutional. 
Despite the unfriendly political response, the argument that the Vice 
President is a legislative official is not inherently absurd.  The Constitution 
gives the Vice President no executive powers; the Vice President’s only du-
ties are to preside over the Senate8 and to become President if the serving 
President dies or leaves office.9  Traditionally, what staff, office, and per-
 
4  See id.; Scott Shane, Agency is Target in Cheney Fight on Secrecy Data, N. Y. TIMES, June 22, 
2007, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D02E2D6103FF931A15755C0A96 
19C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=print (link). 
5  See, e.g., David Sarasohn, The Real Cheney:  The Vice President’s Constitutional Secret Identity, 
OREGONIAN, June 27, 2007, at B4 (“Who knew that the Vice President considered himself partly Con-
gressional?”); The Cheney Exemption, CINCINNATI POST, June 26, 2007 (“Cheney’s rationale is that be-
cause under the Constitution he is president of the Senate—with the sole duty of breaking ties—he is 
actually a member of the Legislative, not the executive branch.  Cheney might not want to push this line 
of reasoning too far.”) 
6  Letter from David Addington, Chief of Staff to the Vice President, to Senator John Kerry (June 
26, 2007), available at http://kerry.senate.gov/newsroom/pdf/Addington_Letter.pdf (link).  The opera-
tive paragraph provides:  
Constitutional issues in government are generally best left for discussion when unavoidable dis-
putes arise in specific contexts instead of in theoretical discussions.  Given that the executive order 
treats the Vice President like the President rather than like an ‘agency,’ it is not necessary in these 
circumstances to address the subject of any alternative reasoning, based on the legislative func-
tions of the vice presidency and the more modern executive functions of the vice presidency, to 
reach the same conclusion that the vice presidency is not an ‘agency’ with respect to which ISOO 
has a role. 
7  Cheney, for example, has been described as “the most powerful vice president in history” and a 
virtual co-President to Bush.  Kenneth Walsh, The Man Behind the Curtain, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, October 13, 2003, at 26, available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/031013/ 
13cheney.htm (link).  See also STEPHEN F. HAYES, CHENEY:  THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S MOST 
POWERFUL AND CONTROVERSIAL VICE PRESIDENT 307–08 (2007) (describing Cheney’s role as a wield-
er of executive power).  In at least one case, Cheney was treated equivalently to the President in com-
munications with the Department of Justice.  This parallel structure also extended to the Chief of Staff 
and Counsel to the Vice President.  Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales to Heads of Department Com-
ponents and United States Attorneys (May 4, 2006), available at 
http://www.rawstory.com/images/other/GonzalesPolicy.pdf (link). 
8  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 4. 
9  U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §§ 1, 3–4.  It is worth noting that the power to communicate the Presi-
dent’s incapacity is shared with other officials whose character is clearly legislative—the Speaker of the 
House and the president pro tempore of the Senate. 
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quisites the Vice President enjoyed came via the Senate; it was not until 
Spiro Agnew mounted a legislative push that the Vice President got his own 
budget line.10  The Vice President really is not an executive official.  He or 
she executes no laws—and is not part of the President’s administration the 
way that other officials are. The Vice President can’t be fired by the Presi-
dent; as an independently elected officeholder, he can be removed only by 
Congress via impeachment.  (In various separation of powers cases, as 
noted below, the Supreme Court has placed a lot of weight on this who-can-
fire-you test.) 
Traditionally, Vice Presidents haven’t done much, which is why the 
position was famously characterized by Vice President John Nance Garner 
as “not worth a bucket of warm [spit].”11  That changed when Jimmy Carter 
gave Fritz Mondale an unusual degree of responsibility,12 a move replicated 
in subsequent administrations, particularly under Clinton/Gore and 
Bush/Cheney.13 
The expansion of vice presidential power, however, obscures a key 
point.  Whatever executive power a Vice President exercises is exercised 
because it is delegated by the President, not because the Vice President pos-
sesses any executive power already.  The Vesting Clause of Article II vests 
all the executive power in the President, with no residuum left over for any-
one else.14  Constitutionally speaking, the Vice President is not a junior or 
co-President, but merely a President-in-waiting, notwithstanding recent po-
litical trends otherwise.  To the extent the President delegates actual power 
and does not simply accept recommendations for action, the Vice President 
is exercising executive authority delegated by the President immune to re-
moval from office by the President, unlike everyone else who exercises 
delegated power.  The only recourse for the President is withdrawal of the 
delegation, with instruction to subordinate officials within the executive 
branch not to listen to the Vice President.15 
 
10  LIGHT, supra note 2, at 69. 
11  Id. at 1. 
12  Id. at 155–57. 
13  For more on the expansion of vice presidential power see David Nather, The Vice Presidency:  An 
Office Under Scrutiny, CONG. Q. WKLY., June 9, 2007, at 1734 (“Ever since Jimmy Carter gave Walter 
F. Mondale an office in the West Wing and the authority to go with it in 1977, vice presidents have 
come to expect a level of influence that would have been unthinkable in earlier decades.”) 
14  U.S. CONST., art II, §1.  See also Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Consti-
tution:  Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1171 (1992) (discussing the 
Vesting Clause in the context of removal power).  I am aware of no argument to the effect that the Vest-
ing Clause of Article II imbues the Vice President with any executive power, and of course such an ar-
gument would be plainly contrary to the text.  Nonetheless, in modern times the presence of some sort of 
“spillover” executive authority in the Vice President seems sometimes to be assumed. 
15  Interestingly, the closest analog to the Vice President in this regard is the First Lady, who also 
sometimes gets delegated tasks, but who has no executive authority of her own.  The First Lady—or 
perhaps, soon, the First Gentleman—can, however, be divorced.  So far, the Bush Administration has 
not advanced any claim that the First Lady is really a legislative officer. 
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However, it seems pretty clear that the President isn’t allowed to dele-
gate executive power to a legislative official, as that would be a separation 
of powers violation.  This is where the claim that Cheney is really a legisla-
tive official creates problems for the White House.  To the extent that this is 
what’s going on, the “Cheney is a legislative official” argument is one that 
opens a big can of worms. 
This question has produced no caselaw, and may never, as it may pose 
a very difficult “political question” or incur standing problems that render it 
not amenable to judicial review.  But any potential challenge to the delega-
tion of executive power to the Vice President poses some serious problems 
if the Vice President is characterized as a legislative official.  In general, the 
delegation of executive power to legislative officials violates the Constitu-
tional separation of powers. 
In Bowsher v. Synar, the leading case on the subject, the Supreme 
Court found that the provisions in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit re-
duction act that vested powers to the Comptroller of the Currency violated 
consitutional separation of powers principles, because the act granted ex-
ecutive authority to an official under the control of Congress.16 Yet, in truth, 
the Comptroller General was not all that easy for Congress to remove:  He 
could be impeached, as can any “civil officer” of the United States, or he 
could be removed for cause via a joint resolution of Congress that was, in 
practice, more difficult to put into practice than impeachment.  More trou-
bling was that the Comptroller General could not be removed by the Presi-
dent: 
The critical factor lies in the provisions of the statute defining the Comptroller 
General’s office relating to removability.  Although the Comptroller General is 
nominated by the President from a list of three individuals recommended by 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of 
the Senate, and confirmed by the Senate, he is removable only at the initiative 
of Congress.17 
The Court found that the power to remove is the key: 
To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only 
to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over the ex-
ecution of the laws.  As the District Court observed:  “Once an officer is ap-
pointed, it is only the authority that can remove him, and not the authority that 
appointed him, that he must fear and, in the performance of his functions, 
obey.”  The structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute 
the laws; it follows that Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control 
what it does not possess.18 
 
16  478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
17  Id. at 727–28 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).   
18  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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As Bowsher states, separation of powers prohibits vesting of executive 
powers in an official subject to (largely notional) control by Congress and 
who is not removable by the President.  If this is the case, then the case for 
vesting executive powers in the Vice President—who is a legislative offi-
cial himself, and also not removable by the President—is even weaker.  In-
deed, this arrangement seems perilously close to permitting “Congress to 
execute the laws,”19 which is plainly out of bounds.20  Thus, if the Vice 
President is a legislative official, as Cheney’s office argued, it would seem 
that his expansive role in the Bush Administration is unconstitutional. 
Nonetheless, a Supreme Court decision addressing this question is un-
likely any time soon.  There are no cases in the pipeline, and it is not clear 
who would bring such an action.  But litigation before the Supreme Court is 
not the only avenue for addressing the arrangement.  Congress is vested, 
under Article I, section 8, with the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, 
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”21  Congress can 
protect the separation of powers, and the viability of Vice Presidents as 
backup presidents, by employing this Constitutional power to prohibit the 
Vice President from exercising any executive functions. 
And, in fact, there may be practical reasons to limit vice presidential 
involvement in day-to-day executive business regardless of whether we ac-
cept the characterization of the Vice Presidency as a legislative office or 
not.  Whether or not the Vice President is seen as a legislative officer, the 
office of Vice President is something special.  The Vice President is, after 
all, primarily meant to serve as a sort of spare President, and—as with spare 
tires or backup servers—it may be safest not to put the spare into ordinary 
service before it’s needed.  Presidents are lost in three ways:  death, resigna-
tion, and impeachment.  Vice presidential involvement in policy has the po-
tential to put the “spare” role at risk in at least two of these contexts.  When 
Presidents resign or are impeached, it is often over matters of policy.  Al-
 
19  Id. 
20  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121–22, 138–39 (1976).  There is also an interesting alterna-
tive argument that the Vice President may not exercise executive powers as a result of the Appointment 
Clause; Buckley quotes language from U.S. v. Germaine, to the effect that  
The Constitution for purposes of appointment very clearly divides all its officers into two classes.  
The primary class requires a nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate.  But fo-
reseeing that when offices became numerous, and sudden removals necessary, this mode might be 
inconvenient, it was provided that, in regard to officers inferior to those specially mentioned, Con-
gress might by law vest their appointment in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the 
heads of departments.  That all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government 
about to be established under the Constitution were intended to be included within one or the oth-
er of these modes of appointment there can be but little doubt. 
Id. at 125 (emphasis added by the Buckley Court) (citing United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509-
10 (1879)).  The application of this language to the Vice President raises some interesting questions that 
are beyond the scope of this brief essay, but the issue is certainly worth noting. 
21  U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added). 
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though the risk that a Vice President will be involved in the precipitating 
events is hard to estimate, it is certainly higher for an activist Vice President 
than it will be for a Vice President playing a traditionally quiescent role.  
Though talk of impeaching the current occupants of either office is unlikely 
to come to anything, it illustrates the risks.22  As an assistant to Vice Presi-
dent Hubert Humphrey once remarked, the most important part of the Vice 
President’s job is as backup President:  “Judge the Vice-President on no 
other measure than his preparation for succession.  He is a reservoir for the 
future rather than a resource for the present.”23  Likewise, a Carter aide 
noted the advantage of Mondale’s distance from public decision making:  
“He can tell everyone he knows how to do the job, but no one can say ‘Fritz 
Mondale was the one who got us into Iran.’”24  That discussion aimed at 
Mondale’s electoral fitness, but it also bears on the viability of a Vice 
President who succeeds the President after resignation or impeachment.  
Had Carter been impeached or forced to resign as a result of the Iran deba-
cle, Mondale’s public distance would have been important in preserving his 
ability to govern. 
Vice Presidents have increasingly been used as resources in the pre-
sent, however.  This growing involvement of Vice Presidents in the execu-
tive department has been generally seen as a good thing, as it allows 
someone deemed by the electorate competent enough to become President 
to put his talents to work for the country, rather than having them languish 
while the Vice President inquires daily into the President’s health.  And 
good arguments exist for not keeping the Vice President entirely out of the 
loop; institutional memory is important for any succession, as illustrated 
with the famous case of Harry Truman’s ignorance about the atomic bomb.  
But the Vice President is the only person nationally elected to serve if the 
President is unable to govern, and the Vice President’s involvement, a la 
Cheney, in day-to-day policy activities sacrifices the distance that earlier 
Vice Presidents possessed; those unhappy with President Bush’s Iraq poli-
cies, for example, can criticize Cheney in a way that critics of Carter’s Iran 
policies could not criticize Mondale.  In the event that policies in which the 
Vice President is implicated go sufficiently awry to end a Presidency, the 
Vice President will not be able to appear as a fresh start and may be liable 
to impeachment or forced resignation as well.  In such cases, this risks a 
move to someone not nationally elected—the Speaker of the House or the 
president pro tempore of the Senate—and very serious consequences for a 
nation that would be, in those circumstances, already divided and vulner-
able.   
 
22  See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Impeach Cheney:  The Vice President Has Run Utterly Amok and Must Be 
Stopped, SLATE, June 27, 2007, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2169292/ (link). 
23  LIGHT, supra note 2, at 52. 
24  Id. 
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All evidence to the contrary notwithstanding, we are not so short of ex-
ecutive talent that we must run such a risk in order to provide the President 
with managerial assistance.  As the Bush/Cheney Administration winds 
down, with the party affiliation of the next administration sufficiently un-
clear so as to minimize partisan game-playing in Congress, now might be a 
good time for Congress to consider requiring that future Vice Presidents 
keep a greater distance from executive affairs. 
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